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“Never Again!” It was the overwhelming cry of those who looked upon the
death and devastation brought about by World War II. Together the nations of
the world worked to implement a system that would prevent similar atrocities
from happening again. Quickly in the war’s aftermath those nations created the
United Nations, whose main purpose was to protect international peace and
security, and prevent aggressive wars. 1 In a similar vein, they tasked the United
Nations with protecting human rights. The Preamble to the United Nations
Charter that entered into force on October 24, 1945 begins:
We the Peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has
brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small . . . .2
The modern human rights movement was birthed in this post-war attempt to
start anew. World War II had seen atrocities committed throughout the world,
Professor and Executive Director, Center for Global Justice, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law,
Regent University School of Law.
1. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
2. Id. at 1035.
+
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including the massacre of six million Jews, nearly two-thirds of the Jewish
population living in Europe before the war.3 The death toll of the war was an
almost unfathomable twenty million soldiers and forty-five million civilians.4
The movement reacted to this evil, and the promotion of human rights was one
of the crucial tools to protect the dignity and rights of all humans, and to confront
and prevent this evil from resurging.
One of the first fruits of this movement was the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, approved by the United Nations
General Assembly and opened for signature on December 9, 1948.5 In it, states
declared genocide to be a crime and committed themselves to working to prevent
genocide and to punish individuals responsible, should it occur again.6 One day
later, the General Assembly—remarkably, without dissent—approved the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.7 The Universal Declaration proclaimed
that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” 8 In its
thirty articles, the Declaration identified fundamental rights that belong to all
humans regardless of race, national origin, sex, power, or wealth.9 These rights
range from the right to life, to freedom from arbitrary arrest, to the right to
work.10
The Universal Declaration was a historic achievement. Harvard Law School
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has called it “the single most important reference
point for cross-cultural discussion of human freedom and dignity in the world
today.”11 In the decades that followed, states committed themselves to many
human rights treaties. Some treaties were created through the United Nations
and others arose through the work of regional human rights organizations such
as the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and the African

3. DAVID WEISSBRODT, FIONNUALA NI AOLÁIN, JOAN FITZPATRICK & FRANK NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND PROCESS 9 (4th ed. 2009).
4. Fred R. Nadis, World War II, World History: The Modern Era, ABCCLIO, https://worldhistory2.abc-clio.com/Topics/Display/33 (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
5. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
1951 U.N.T.S. 278 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
6. Id. at 280.
7. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter Declaration of Human Rights]; History of the Document, U.N.,
http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/index.html (last visited Jan.
30, 2019).
8. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, at art. 1.
9. See id.
10. Id. at arts. 3, 9, 23.
11. Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1998).
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Union.12 Some treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR),13 address a wide number of rights; others, like the Convention
Against Torture,14 focus on one particular right.
Beyond the drafting and ratifying of conventions, since 1945 the human rights
movement has created a complex human rights enforcement structure. The
United Nations boasts a number of offices and entities created pursuant to the
U.N. Charter, such as the Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner
for Human Rights.15 It also deploys additional human rights enforcement bodies
tasked with enforcing specific treaties, such as the Human Rights Committee
that exists only to give effect to the ICCPR.16 The regional systems likewise
have established bodies to enforce human rights, including commissions and
even human rights courts that have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of human
rights violations.17
In significant ways, this system of declarations, conventions, and enforcement
bodies has successfully promoted human dignity and restrained evil. The human
rights movement should be justly proud of progress it has made on challenging
issues like enforced disappearances of individuals in South America18 and the
protection of religious liberty in Europe.19 Human rights standards are openly
discussed and violations are tracked and reported. Historically, some western
nations have conditioned the grant of international aid on compliance with
human rights standards.20 Many former Eastern Bloc states have abandoned
totalitarianism and are now evaluated as “free” in Freedom House’s annual
assessment of the protection of civil and political rights around the world.21 This
transition to states that protect civil and political rights, and the rule of law was
12. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; Statute
of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, E.T.S. No. 1; African (Banjul) Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
13. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19,
1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
14. G.A. Res. 39/46, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (Dec. 10,1984) [hereinafter Convention on Torture].
15. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/251, Human Rights Council (Mar. 15, 2006).
16. Human
Rights
Committee,
OHCHR,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2018).
17. Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 12; Statute of the Council of
Europe, supra note 12; Banjul Charter, supra note 12.
18. Enforced Disappearances: Progress and Challenges in South America, OHCHR (Aug.
31, 2012), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Enforced-Disappearances-progress-andchallenges-in-South-America.aspx.
19. JEFFREY A. BRAUCH, FLAWED PERFECTION 87 (2017).
20. See generally The Law Library of Congress, Regulation of Foreign Aid in Selected
Countries 2011/2012 10, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/foreign-aid/regulation-foreign-aid.pdf
(providing a collection of reports detailing how countries around the world handle foreign aid).
21. Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis, FREEDOM HOUSE,
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018.
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greatly aided by the European Union conditioning membership on states’
commitment to protecting basic human rights.22
This story about confronting evil cannot end here, however. While the human
rights movement sees and confronts evil “out there,” it often fails to recognize
that evil affects all of us, including those of us dedicated to promoting human
rights. Like all humans and human-created institutions, we, and the entities we
establish, are tempted to engage in self-dealing and assert authority without
accountability. At times, individuals and states use human rights language and
institutions to disguise or even achieve evil ends.
The human rights movement is particularly susceptible to the vice of hubris.
Hubris is “excessive pride or self-confidence.”23 While pride can have positive
aspects—for example, the human rights movement can appropriately take pride
in the number of states around the world that have banned human trafficking—
hubris is a vice. It is a form of pride that can cause harm. Yale Professor Donald
Kagan defines hubris as “a kind of violent arrogance which comes upon men
when they see themselves as more than human and behave as if they were
divine.”24 Kagan highlights the Greek origins of the concept, noting that the
great temple of Apollo at Delphi featured these inscriptions: “Know Thyself,”
and “Nothing in Excess.”25 He says that together these warned ambitious
Greeks: “[k]now your own limitations as a fallible mortal and then exercise
moderation because you are not divine, you are mortal.”26 Kagan likewise
describes the Greek view this way: “[m]an is potent and important, yet he is
fallible and mortal, capable of the greatest achievements and the worst crimes.” 27
Such hubris infects—and threatens—the human rights movement. The
movement recognizes there is evil in the world; that is why the movement exists.
But it fails to recognize that we ourselves—like all humans—are flawed. This
hubris particularly shows itself in two ways. First, the movement has embraced
a utopian expansion of rights to be protected. The view resembles that from the
movie Field of Dreams: if we build it they will come. If we simply identify
something as a fundamental human right, that right will be promoted and
enforced. Second, the movement has a utopian view of the bodies created to
22. Edwin Rekosh, Constructing Public Interest Law: Transnational Collaboration and
Exchange in Central and Eastern Europe, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 55, 71–73 (2008);
European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, EUR. COMMISSION,
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en (last visited
Jan. 10, 2019).
23. Hubris, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/hubris (last
visited Jan. 19, 2019).
24. Donald Kagan, Ancient Greek History Course: Lecture 1, at 21:17 (Nov. 20, 2008)
(downloaded using iTunes).
25. Id. at 11:24.
26. Id. at 11:35.
27. Id. at 31:35.

2019]

Human Rights and the Prevention of Evil

429

enforce human rights. The assumption is that if we set up an organization with
a noble purpose, it will achieve noble aims. Both assumptions are false. Our
expansion of rights claims—both in the number and scope of these claims—has
begun to dilute the significance of rights and at times even diminish their
enforcement. And we have too often established human rights enforcement
bodies lacking proper checks and balances.
Despite its many successes, in its hubris, the human rights movement has not
fulfilled its promise to restrain evil—and, indeed, its future ability to do so is
endangered—because it fails to recognize these flaws within itself. This article
tells the story of that failure.
At the Regent University Center for Global Justice, Human Rights, and the
Rule of Law28 our mission is to help train the next generation of advocates to
protect the poor, oppressed, and enslaved around the world, and to serve those
already doing this important work.29 Every year our students and graduates are
deployed in internships and fellowships around the globe, working with
organizations that do outstanding work to prevent human trafficking, promote
religious liberty, and protect the land rights of vulnerable populations.30 Alumni
are currently prosecuting sexual abusers and protecting widows from land
grabbing.31
It is affection for and a commitment to protecting human rights that prompts
this Article. This Article will first explore the ways hubris has hindered the
protection of rights, both by looking at the utopian expansion of rights claims
and by looking at the lack of accountability and transparency in human rights
organizations. It will then offer suggestions for how we can, with humility and
proper expectations, achieve the goal of protecting the rights and dignity of all
humans, and effectively confront and prevent evil.
I. UTOPIAN EXPANSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS CLAIMS

A. Extent of the Expansion of Human Rights Claims

One of the most striking developments in the world of human rights since
1945 has been the breathtaking expansion in the number and scope of asserted
rights. The idealism fueling this expansion should not have been a surprise.
From the beginning, the notion of protecting human rights was visionary and
idealistic. Indeed, Yale professor Samuel Moyn insists that protecting human
rights is inherently utopian:
28. The author serves as the executive director of the University’s Center for Global Justice,
Human Rights, and the Rule of Law. Faculty, REGENT U., https://www.regent.edu/school-oflaw/faculty/jd-jeffrey-a-brauch/.
29. Mission & Vision, REGENT U. SCH. OF L., CTR FOR GLOBAL JUST., HUM. RTS, & THE
RULE OF L., https://www.regent.edu/acad/schlaw/globaljustice/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
30. Id. at Internship and Fellowship Programs.
31. Id. at Alumni Profiles.
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The phrase [“human rights”] implies an agenda for improving the
world, and bringing about a new one in which the dignity of each
individual will enjoy secure international protection. It is a
recognizably utopian program: for the political standards it champions
and the emotional passion it inspires, this program draws on the image
of a place that has not yet been called into being. It promises to
penetrate the impregnability of state borders, slowly replacing them
with the authority of international law. It prides itself on offering
victims the world over the possibility of a better life. 32
Idealism can be good. It can inspire hope and motivate action. The idealism
of human rights is partly what attracted many to engage with the human rights
movement. But that idealism becomes hubris when we make the unjustified
assumption that by simply asserting something as a human right, it will naturally
be embraced and enforced. Professor Eric Posner highlights this distinction and
argues that the human rights movement has indeed crossed the line from noble
and helpful idealism to hubris. He writes:
With the benefit of hindsight, we can see that the human rights treaties
were not so much an act of idealism as an act of hubris, with more than
a passing resemblance to the civilizing efforts undertaken by western
governments and missionary groups in the 19th century, which did
little good for native populations while entangling European powers
in the affairs of countries they did not understand. A humbler
approach is long overdue.33
The Universal Declaration consists of 30 articles proclaiming a variety of
rights. Some are broad, such as the right to work, the right to rest and leisure,
and the right to education.34 Such rights are referred to as economic, social, and
cultural rights—or sometimes second generation (human) rights. 35
Most, though, are civil and political rights: rights to life, to be free from
arbitrary arrest, to not be enslaved, and to have freedom of religion and
expression.36 These are sometimes referred to as first generation (human)
rights.37 In general terms, first generation rights typically impose limits on
government power as opposed to second generation rights, which mandate an
expansion of government roles or power for their enforcement. 38
32. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 1 (2010).
33. Eric Posner, The Case Against Human Rights, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2014, 1:00 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/04/-sp-case-against-human-rights.
34. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, arts. 23–24, 26.
35. H. VICTOR CONDÉ, A HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TERMINOLOGY
133–34 (David P. Forsythe et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999).
36. See Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7.
37. CONDÉ, supra note 35, at 46.
38. Burns H. Weston, Human Rights, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.britannica.com/topic/human-rights. This is not always the case. For example, Article
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Since 1948, the number and types of rights enumerated in human rights
declarations and treaties has greatly expanded. The Freedom Rights Project
calculates that a European state has the option to ratify 27 different treaties
created under the auspices of the United Nations and another 37 treaties created
under the auspices of the Council of Europe.39 Professors Jacob Mchangama
and Guglielmo Verdirame, two of the founders of the Freedom Rights Project,
calculate that this results in 1377 different obligations to which a European state
may commit itself.40 Of course, some of these obligations are duplicative, but
nonetheless, the number of potential commitments is large.
In recent years, the expansion of human rights has not simply been a matter
of mathematics; many of the rights being articulated are themselves much more
expansive in their scope and reach. And while there has been general agreement
for many years over the nature of core civil and political rights, such as the right
to life and the right to be free from slavery, there is much less agreement about
the scope of some rights being advocated currently.
Today, for example, there is much more emphasis on a third category of
human rights that is significantly different from those described above. This
generation of rights consists of what is known as “collective” or “group rights.”41
Group rights, which have been largely advanced by nations emerging from
colonialism, extend entitlements to not just individuals but “peoples.”42 The
name of the primary African human rights convention, the African (Banjul)
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, reflects this perspective. 43
Group rights tend to make very broad claims. African Charter Article 24 states
for example: “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory
environment favorable to their development.”44 While a noble aspiration, its

8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts: “Everyone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the constitution or by law.” Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, art. 8. The fulfillment
of this right requires governments to establish a justice system to investigate and prosecute criminal
offenses.
39. JACOB MCHANGAMA & GUGLIELMO VERDIRAME, FREEDOM RIGHTS PROJECT: HUMAN
RIGHTS
INFLATION
10–12
(2013),
http://www.freedomrights.info/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/HR-Inflation.pdf.
40. Id. at 12.
41. CONDÉ, supra note 35, at 19.
42. See generally Richard N. Kiwanuka, The Meaning of “People” in the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 80, 80 (1988) (discussing how the Banjul Charter
departed from contemporary human rights instruments in how it defined “people”).
43. See Banjul Charter, supra note 12.
44. Id. at art. 24.
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breadth and general nature leave very unclear who exercises this right or how it
might be enforced.45
Group rights are not just an African phenomenon. The U.N. General
Assembly, for example, has declared that both individuals and groups have the
right to development: “The right to development is an inalienable human right
by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate
in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development,
in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.” 46
Note the breathtaking scope of this asserted right. The right to development has
broad reaching implications for all political, economic, social, and cultural facets
of life.47
Many recent expressions of rights claims reflect this tendency to swell the
scope of asserted entitlements. While these expanded rights often use idealistic
and inspiring language, they can also be vague, utopian, unclear as to what is
included in the right, and how that right should be enforced. Professor David
Smolin describes it this way: “The language of human rights has in many
respects already been reduced to the role of vacuous platitudes which evoke
warm feelings and high ideals but are not intended to contribute to the hard work
of settling disputes or governing peoples.”48
One of the best recent examples of the broad and utopian expansion of human
rights is found in the recent Declaration on the Right to Peace, approved on
December 19, 2016 by the United Nations General Assembly. 49 The declaration
was the culmination of an eight year process that began in 2009 with a workshop
to explore the notion of a right to peace.50 A year later, the United Nations
Human Rights Council adopted a resolution tasking an advisory committee with
preparing a draft declaration.51 In 2012, the Council established a working group
to specify just what was encompassed within the right to peace.52
From the beginning, not everyone agreed that peace should—or could—be
enshrined as a human right. Some Western states expressed concern over the
45. Jack Donnelly, In Defense of the Universal Declaration Model, in INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF GROUPS 20, 32–33 (Lyons
et al. eds., 2003).
46. G.A. Res. 41/128, annex, Declaration on the Right to Development, art.1, para. 1 (Dec. 4,
1986).
47. Id.
48. David M. Smolin, Church, State, and International Human Rights: A Theological
Appraisal, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1515, 1535 (1998).
49. See G.A. Res. 32/28, annex, Declaration on the Right to Peace (July 1, 2016).
50. Christian Guillermet-Fernández & David Fernández Puyana, The General Assembly
Adopts the Declaration on the Right to Peace, 2 ERUDITIO 39, 44 (2017),
http://eruditio.worldacademy.org/files/vol2issue3/reprints/Eruditio-v2-i3-right-to-peacecfernandez-dpuyana-reprint.pdf.
51. Id. at 44–45.
52. Id. at 45.
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breadth and vagueness of the proposed right. Early on, representatives of the
European Union objected that there is no agreed upon definition of peace nor an
agreement as to who would be the right-holders and duty-bearers of such a
right.53 The United States also argued: “The proposed right is neither recognized
nor defined in any universal, binding instrument, and its parameters are entirely
unclear. Nor is there any consensus, in theory or in state practice, as to what
such a right would entail.”54
Nonetheless, a more utopian impulse prevailed. Some delegations opined that
the
current initiative on the right to peace could become a great
opportunity to stop wars and armed conflicts in the world and
consequently, to avoid all human rights violations . . . . [This initiative
is] also a means [to an agreement as to who would be the rightsbearers and duty-bearers of such a right] to eliminate all kinds of
violence against people.55
The Declaration’s text certainly reflects this utopian vision. It sets forth a very
broad definition of peace: “Recognizing that peace is not only the absence of
conflict but also requires a positive, dynamic, participatory process where
dialogue is encouraged and conflicts are solved in a spirit of mutual
understanding and cooperation, and socio-economic development is ensured.” 56
The Declaration’s prefatory language very much ties the right to peace with
the fulfillment of group rights: “Acknowledging that the fuller development of
a culture of peace is integrally linked to the realization of the right of all peoples
. . . to self-determination . . . .”57
The Declaration’s operative language, though short, is likewise broad:
Article 1. Everyone has the right to enjoy peace such that all human
rights are promoted and protected and development is fully realized.
Article 2. States should respect, implement and promote equality and
non-discrimination, justice and the rule of law, and guarantee freedom
from fear and want as a means to build peace within and between
societies.58
The Declaration is eloquent. It lays out a noble vision. But that eloquence
and nobility do not somehow transform the declared right into something with a
clear meaning that is attainable or enforceable.
53. Id. at 43.
54. Karima Bennoune, A Peace of Her, 19 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 63, 65 (2015).
55. Guillermet-Fernández & Puyana, supra note 50, at 46.
56. G.A. Res. 71/189, annex, Declaration on the Right to Peace, at 3 (Dec. 19, 2016).
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id. at 5. By referencing a right to be free from fear and want, the Declaration consciously
associates itself with President Roosevelt’s historic World War II call for the world to embrace four
essential freedoms: freedom of expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom
from fear. CONDÉ, supra note 35, at 47.
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The Declaration on the Right to Peace reflects a view that is becoming more
commonplace: if something is good for human flourishing it must be declared
to be a human right. Professor S. Matthew Liao displays this view when he
advocates for recognition of the right of children to be loved:
[T]he right of children to be loved is a human right. Specifically, my
argument is that human beings have human rights to the fundamental
conditions for pursuing a good life. As human beings, children
therefore have human rights to the fundamental conditions for
pursuing a good life. Being loved is a fundamental condition for
children to pursue a good life. Therefore, children have a right to be
loved.59
Only the most heartless among us could quarrel with the virtue of children
being loved. But that does not mean that this should be articulated as a human
right subject to international promotion and enforcement.
This sweeping expansion of what is meant by human rights is not just a matter
of academic discussion. It animates the day-to-day work of key human rights
institutions and officials. For example, in February 2014, the Office of the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights announced with fanfare that the U.N.
Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights was launching a new study on
the effect of advertising on cultural rights, including “the right of people to
choose their way of life.”60 Specifically, the Special Rapporteur, Farida
Shaheed, expressed concern over the effect that billboards and public screens
were having on viewers world-wide. She insisted that “[o]ne underlying
problem relates to the impact that advertising and marketing practices may have
on cultural diversity and the right of people to choose their way of life.” 61
B. Problems with the Proliferation of Rights

Why should we be concerned with the expansion in the number and scope of
asserted rights? First, simply asserting more rights—and even convincing states
to embrace those rights in treaties—does not actually lead to greater protection
of rights. Second, and worse, the proliferation of rights may at times interfere
with the protection of human rights.
59. S. MATTHEW LIAO, THE RIGHT TO BE LOVED 7 (2015).
60. U.N. Expert Kicks off New Study on the Impact of Advertising and Marketing on Cultural
Rights,
OHCHR
(Feb.
7,
2014),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14227&LangID=E.
61. Id. In a further example of Shaheed’s broad focus, she warned of the threat posed to
cultural rights in Vietnam by tourists seeking to hear the Cong drum. Shaheed said [the Cong drum]
is “being played on demand for tourists in some places, thus clearly losing its original cultural
significance.” Pedro Pizano, The Human Rights that Dictators Love, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 26,
2014, 3:45 PM), http://foreign policy.com/2014/02/26/the-human-rights-that-dictatorslove/.
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1. The Proliferation of Rights Does Not Lead to Greater Protection of Rights

For nearly twenty years, researchers studied the impact declarations and
treaties had on human rights compliance. The results demonstrate that the
existence of more treaties—and more states ratifying them—does not mean real
compliance and protection for human rights. In 1999, political science professor
Linda Camp Keith analyzed the relationship between states ratifying the ICCPR
and their respect for the rights included in it. 62 In 2002, Yale Law Professor
Oona Hathaway performed a similar analysis on the effect that ratifying a variety
of human rights treaties had on compliance with the rights covered within
them.63 “Both studies find no statistically significant relationship, and Hathaway
argues that the relationship in some cases is actually negative.” 64
More recent data affirms this conclusion. In 2013, Professor Emilie HafnerBurton published the results of her study on the impact that ratifying the ICCPR
had on the levels of government-sponsored murder, torture, political
imprisonment, and forced disappearances. She found that the fact that a country
has ratified the ICCPR has little to do with whether the country will actually
comply with it. Some comply, others do not. On average, though, “there is little
change—for better or worse—even decades after most countries ratify . . . .
[T]he vast majority of countries keep acting the way they did before they
ratified.”65
Perhaps the most disheartening conclusion from Hafner-Burton’s research is
“the evidence that participation in some treaties correlates with worse human
rights behavior. That is, some countries that ratify some treaties actually engage
in violations of those rights more frequently after they ratify than countries that
do not ratify.”66
Some of the worst human rights abusers are regular endorsers of human rights
documents. For example, North Korea has ratified both the ICCPR and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).67
62. See generally Linda Camp Keith, The United Nations International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?, 36 J. OF PEACE RES.
95, 95 (1999) (suggesting that parties to this international covenant may not produce an observable
impact on the state party’s actual behavior).
63. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE. L. J. 1935,
1939 (2002) (suggesting that noncompliance with treaty obligations appears to be common among
parties).
64. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 121
(2006).
65. EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY 73 (2013).
66. Id. at 75. Law Professor Eric Posner notes that “[e]ach of the six major human rights
treaties has been ratified by more than 150 countries, yet many of them remain hostile to human
rights. This raises the nagging question of how much human rights law has actually influenced the
behaviour of governments.” Posner, supra note 33.
67. See Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR, http://indicators.ohchr.org/
(last visited Jan. 9, 2019).
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Sudan has ratified these conventions as well as the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.68 Of course, these
ratifications did not deter Sudan from committing genocide against Africans in
the Darfur region of the country in the century’s first decade.69
It is clear that if we want human rights to be concretely protected, much more
is needed than creating declarations or treaties, or even ratifying them. 70
Idealistic and utopian aspirations are not enough.
2. Human Rights Proliferation Can Actually Be Harmful

Much more concerning than the conclusion that the proliferation of human
rights does not help is that it may actually hurt. In significant ways, human rights
may be more poorly protected as we continue to expand the number of rights
affirmed or treaties ratified.
The reason expansion of human rights may actually thwart rights enforcement
relates to the hubris discussed in the introduction. With excessive and
unwarranted self-confidence, the human rights movement implicitly assumes
that when states choose to ratify human rights conventions, they act out of good
faith, with at least the intention to comply with convention terms. But states do
not always engage in good faith. Some regularly ratify human rights instruments
with no intention of complying with their terms.71 And sometimes they use
human rights language and institutions to disguise or even achieve evil ends. 72
And this becomes easier to do as the number of human rights norms increases.
Why would nations ratify conventions with no intention of compliance? At a
basic level, it is relatively easy to ratify a convention, gaining international
political capital for doing so, while it is rare that a state will face serious
consequences for failing to comply. This is especially true given that the human
rights enforcement system is quite stretched in its resources. Professor HafnerBurton notes the likely consequence: “Expansion [of rights], especially in the
context of an already thinly stretched bureaucracy, probably will lead to more
lawbreaking, and further erode the credibility and legitimacy of the system.” 73
68. Id.
69. BRAUCH, supra note 19, at 95–97, 101.
70. Posner, supra note 33; see also STEPHEN HOPGOOD, THE ENDTIMES OF HUMAN RIGHTS
142 (2013) (defining “Hubris: pride, arrogance, an overestimation of one’s capabilities. The
humanist metanarrative gives the impression that the success of norms lies in their inherent justness;
that is, the norms are their own best advocates, their inner demand for justice persuasive in and of
itself. But mobilization politically requires a lot more.”).
71. Joshua Keating, Why Countries Make Human Rights Pledges They Have No Intention of
Honoring, SLATE (Oct. 21, 2014, 3:13 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/10/whycountries-make-human-rights-pledges-they-have-no-intention-of-honoring.html.
72. Pizano, supra note 61.
73. HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 65, at 130. The principle that multiplying unenforceable
legal prohibitions actually leads to lawlessness has been acknowledged for centuries. Thomas
Aquinas famously urged that human law should not prescribe all virtues or proscribe all vices.
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More troubling is that ratifying numerous human rights instruments can
become a tool to intentionally thwart meaningful human rights enforcement.
States with a history of violating basic civil and political rights can turn to their
track record of supporting expansive or vague group or cultural rights and show
a “good human rights record.” Pedro Pizano, Strategy and Development
Associate for the Human Rights Foundation, describes the dynamic:
Yet, it is precisely because of this proliferation that states can cherrypick the rights whose obligations they promise to fulfill sometime in
the future—and thus, show off a “good” human rights record, even as
they fail to uphold even the most basic civil and political rights.
Desirable outcomes like housing or health care—better understood as
political goals—were cloaked in rights language to make them seem
more legitimate.74
Professor Jacob Mchangama similarly argues:
When everything can be defined as a human right, the premium on
violating such rights is cheap . . . . By presenting themselves as the
champions of these third-generation rights, illiberal states seek to both
remove the moral high ground from civil and political rights and to
achieve political legitimacy. Rights proliferation is being abused by
dictatorships to praise each other, and is diminishing the moral clarity
that human rights once enjoyed.75
Mchangama compares human rights to a currency that
has been seriously devalued through the process of rights inflation
taking place in international organizations. And in its devalued state
the currency of human rights is sometimes more likely to buy cover
and legitimacy for dictatorships than purchase protection against the
abuse of citizens by such states and thereby undermine the core values
of liberty and the rule of law that underpin human rights.76
Instead, “human law does not prohibit all vices from which the virtuous abstain but only the more
serious ones from which it is possible for the majority to abstain . . . .” S AINT THOMAS AQUINAS,
THE TREATISE ON LAW 316 (R. J. Henle ed., 1993).
74. Pizano, supra note 61.
75. Id.
76. Freedom Rights Project, International Human Rights: Problems & Solutions, YOUTUBE
1:09–1:36
(Jan.
30,
2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NTtCa3eNDfw&list=PLTOiPfXv5mili1YyvVUhAmk44OV
9ho0oj&index=3. This is not a new phenomenon. In 1991, Phillip Allott warned:
[I]n all societies governments have been reassured in their arrogance by the idea that,
if they are not proved actually to be violating the substance of particularized human
rights, if they can bring their willing and acting within the wording of this or that
formula with its lawyerly qualifications and exceptions, then they are doing well
enough. The idea of human rights should intimidate governments or it is worth
nothing. If the idea of human rights reassures governments it is worse than nothing.
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These expressions of concern are not idle speculation. There is ample
evidence that some states use the language or institutional structure of human
rights to protect themselves from scrutiny or criticism. Professors Rosa
Freedman and Jacob Mchangama conducted a study of how states respond to
proposals for special procedures at the United Nations Human Rights Council.77
The Human Rights Council uses special procedures to empower independent
human rights experts to report and advise on the human rights situation relating
to a specific country or to a particular right. Freedman and Mchangama
compared the behavior of nations evaluated as “free” by Freedom House with
that of states evaluated “not free” and found a wide disparity between how free
and non-free states support or oppose special procedure mandates depending on
the type of right at stake.78
Non-free states “rarely” supported the creation of mandates dealing with civil
and political rights, which were more focused and where violations could be
clearly identified and adjudicated.79 But they regularly supported creating
mandates dealing with broader and more aspirational—and less obviously
enforceable—people’s, and economic and social rights.80 Significantly, free
states acted in just the opposite way.81
In the same way, states with poor records of enforcing basic civil and political
rights frequently support the recognition of broader, vaguer, and less enforceable
rights. A good example occurred in 2008 in conjunction with a working group
on an optional protocol to the ICESCR entitled, “Promotion and Protection of
All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Including the Right to Development.”82 Notes from the working committee
report the following: “252. The Islamic Republic of Iran stated that the protocol
provided an opportunity to reiterate the equal status of all human rights.” 83
Contrast Iran’s enthusiastic response to such a broad rights affirmation with the
more cautious response from the United Kingdom: “246. The United Kingdom
reserved its position on the draft. It remained sceptical about the practical
benefits of the protocol, considering that economic, social and cultural rights

PHILIP ALLOT, EUNOMIA: NEW WORLD ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 288 (1991).
77. See Rosa Freedman & Jacob Mchangama, Expanding or Diluting Human Rights?: The
Proliferation of United Nations Special Procedures Mandates, 38 HUM. RTS. Q. 164, 165 (2016).
78. Id. at 171.
79. Id. at 181.
80. Id. at 180–81.
81. Id.
82. Rep. of the Open-ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on its Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/7
(May 6, 2008).
83. Id. at 30.
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did not lend themselves to adjudication in the same way as civil and political
rights.”84
Why might states that abuse basic civil and political rights want to expand the
collection of human rights norms? They leave more room to hide. A year after
this working group, Iran held an election that was widely viewed as rigged.85
The government used violence to put down demonstrators who spoke out in
opposition.86 Although denying basic rights of expression and association, when
questioned on its human rights record, Iran could point to its strong record on
the right to development.
Iran is not alone. Less than a year before its bloody civil war began, Syria
invited special rapporteurs on the right to food and health to visit the nation. The
special rapporteurs:
generally praised the human rights record of Syria but were silent on
the repressive nature of the regime. The Special Rapporteur on the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health stated that: “Syria’s commendable work
in the last three decades to improve the health system as a whole, and
its commitment to ensure access to healthcare for all” with regard to
concerns the Special Rapporteur “noted with dismay that smoking is
still highly prevalent in Syria.”87
While Syria embraced these investigations, Syria had ignored multiple
requests from special rapporteurs on torture and treatment of human rights
defenders, and from working groups on forced disappearances and arbitrary
detention.88 Within months the Syrian government would use military force
against its own people, even using chemical weapons in 2013.89 Since 2011, the
civil war has killed over 400,000 Syrians.90 While Syria blatantly violated basic
84. Id. at 29.
85. See, e.g., Simon Robinson, Was Ahmadinejad’s Win Rigged?, TIME (June 15, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1904645_1904644_1904643,00.ht
ml#.
86. Violence Grips Tehran Amid Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2009),
www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/world/middleeast/14iran.html.
87. Freedman & Mchangama, supra note 77, at 191 (quoting U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health:
Visit to Syria, 6-14 Nov. 2010.
Preliminary observations, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10532&LangID=E).
88. Id.
89. ‘Clear and Convincing’ Evidence of Chemical Weapons Use in Syria, U.N. Team Reports,
U.N. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013), https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/09/449052-clear-and-convincingevidence-chemical-weapons-use-syria-un-team-reports.
90. John Hudson, U.N. Envoy Revises Syria Death Toll to 400,000, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 22,
2016, 4:14 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/22/u-n-envoy-revises-syria-death-toll-to400000/.
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civil and political rights of its own people, it was able to hide behind its “good
human rights record.”
There are in fact many such examples of nations sheltering themselves or their
allies from human rights scrutiny by embracing the expansion of human rights—
especially the expansion of second and third generation rights:
[A]t its Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before the UN Human
Rights Council in December 2011, the criticism of Zimbabwe by
democratic countries was accompanied by acclaim from the likes of
Angola, Sri Lanka, and North Korea for its efforts to promote socioeconomic rights. Likewise at its 2010 UPR North Korea was praised
by Iran, Cuba, Syria and Russia for, inter alia, working ‘to consolidate
a socialist and just society, which guarantees equality and social
justice.’91
States not only protect themselves by sheltering under the ever-expanding
treaty system, certain nations at times claim the “right” to engage in behavior
that actually thwarts basic civil and political rights.
China cites “the right to development” to explain why the Chinese
government gives priority to economic growth over political
liberalisation. Many countries cite the “right to security,” a catch-all
idea that protection from crime justifies harsh enforcement methods.
Vladimir Putin cited the rights of ethnic minorities in Ukraine in order
to justify his military intervention there . . . .92
A particularly destructive form of using rights language to actually restrict
rights is seen in the rise of prohibitions of what is known as “defamation of
religion.”93 Freedoms of religion and expression have been embraced from the
beginning of the human rights movement as foundational, core rights. For
example, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights proclaims:
Article 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.94
91. Mchangama & Verdirame, supra note 39, at 18. Similarly, “China has repeatedly
undertaken considerable efforts to avert, through procedural means, the adoption of a critical
resolution on its own human rights situation.” GERD OBERLEITNER, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTIONS 9 (2007). While the expansion of rights can provide cover for a repressive regime
to shield its own record, it also can provide a platform from which to attack the moral failings of
others. For example, North Korea insisted before the Human Rights Council that “it is a wellknown fact that the US is the worst human rights violator in the world.” ROSA FREEDMAN, FAILING
TO PROTECT: THE U.N. AND THE POLITICISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 76 (2014).
92. Posner, supra note 33.
93. Id.
94. Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 7, art. 18.
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Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.95
These rights are also enshrined in the ICCPR and specified in greater detail. 96
Despite these venerable protections, an influential group of states has sought
to restrict the freedom of religion and expression, and it has done so in the very
name of human rights. It has been led by the Organisation of the Islamic
Cooperation, an organization consisting of 57 states that seek to restrict speech
that it deems critical of Mohammed, Islam, or Muslims.97 Many such states
place strong restrictions on speech and religion domestically, generally
prohibiting conversion to religions other than Islam and banning proselytizing. 98
These states have also turned to the international community—and human
rights institutions in particular—to restrict proselytizing and speech deemed
critical of Muslims in non-Muslim nations. The Organization of Islamic
Cooperation (OIC) has been particularly successful in its efforts before the
Human Rights Council. In 2008, with strong OIC backing, the Human Rights
Council passed a resolution condemning speech that is critical of Islam 99 and
declared that such speech actually undermines human rights: “Defamation of
religions is among the causes of social disharmony and instability, at the national
and international levels, and leads to violations of human rights.” 100 The
resolution likewise asserted: “[R]espect of religions and their protection from
contempt is an essential element conducive for the exercise by all of the right to
freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”101
The resolution “urges” nations to restrict the freedom of expression to stop
the spread of critical expression. Article 8 “[u]rges States to take actions to
prohibit the dissemination, including through political institutions and
organizations, of racist and xenophobic ideas and material aimed at any religion

95. Id. at art. 19.
96. ICCPR, supra note 13, at arts. 18–19.
97. History,
ORGANISATION
OF
ISLAMIC
COOPERATION,
https://www.oicoci.org/page/?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en (last visited June 30, 2019); Robert C. Blitt, Defamation
of Religion: Rumors of Its Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 347, 352
(2011).
98. See generally U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2017)
[hereinafter USCIRF ANN. REP. 2017]; see also infra text accompanying note 107.
99. While this resolution speaks of defamation of religion in general, it addresses the increase
in Islamophobia, in particular, following the events of September 11, 2001. Human Rights Council
Res. 7/19 (Mar. 27, 2008).
100. Id.
101. Id. at para. 10.
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or its followers that constitute incitement to racial and religious hatred, hostility
or violence.”102 The resolution passed 21 to 10 (with 14 abstentions).103
In 2010, the Human Rights Council passed another resolution condemning the
defamation of religions (this time including Judaism and Christianity by
name).104 The vote on this resolution was closer (20 to 17, with 8 abstentions).105
These resolutions were passed by what is described as the U.N.’s principal
body dedicated to the protection of human rights.106 The Council framed its
findings and recommendations in human rights affirming language. But the
resolutions are hostile to the real protection of human rights. They severely
restrict the freedoms of expression and religion. They can be used to justify bans
on any critical discussion of religion as well as mission work.
The hypocrisy of these resolutions and efforts is evident when examining the
religious freedom records of nations supporting these efforts. For example,
China, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan supported both of these resolutions and are
all recognized as major violators of religious freedom. At the time these
resolutions were passed, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom recommended that the State Department designate each of these
nations as “countries of particular concern,” being engaged in serious violations
of religious freedom under the International Religious Freedom Act.107
In 2010, the same year the Human Rights Council passed its second
Defamation of Religions resolution, the Commission on International Religious
Freedom found the following regarding China:
In China, the government continues to engage in systematic and
egregious violations of the freedom of religion or belief . . . . The
government continues its campaign to “transform” unregistered
Christian groups and “strike hard” against “evil cults,” leading to the
arrest, imprisonment, and mistreatment of religious adherents.
Thousands of “house church” Protestants have been detained in the
past two years.108
102. Id. at para. 8.
103. Id.
104. Human Rights Council Res. 13/16, U.N. Doc. A/13/16, at 2 (Apr. 15, 2010).
105. Again, it urged “all States to provide, within their respective legal and constitutional
systems, adequate protection against acts of hatred, discrimination, intimidation and coercion
resulting from defamation of religions and incitement to religious hatred in general, and to take all
possible measures to promote tolerance and respect for all religions and beliefs.” Id. at para. 14.
106. Freedman & Mchangama, supra note 77, at 164–65.
107. Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, USCIRF Eleventh Annual
Report on Religious Freedom in the World Released (Apr. 29, 2010), https://www.uscirf.gov/newsroom/press-releases/uscirf-eleventh-annual-report-religious-freedom-in-the-world-released. See
International Religious Freedom Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401–6481 (1988).
108. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (2010) [hereinafter
USCIRF ANN. REP. 2010]. The Commission has found that China continues to violate religious
liberty in significant ways. See USCIRF ANN. REP. 2017, supra note 98, at 32.
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In the same year, the Commission found the following with regard to Saudi
Arabia:
Systematic, egregious, and ongoing religious freedom violations
continue in Saudi Arabia . . . . [T]he Saudi government persists in
banning all forms of public religious expression other than that of the
government’s own interpretation of one school of Sunni Islam, and
interferes with private religious practice of both Muslims and nonMuslim expatriate workers.109
Again in 2010, the Commission made the following findings regarding religious
freedom in Pakistan:
Serious religious freedom concerns persist in Pakistan, where
religiously discriminatory legislation has fostered an atmosphere of
intolerance . . . . A number of Pakistan’s laws abridge freedom of
religion or belief . . . . Blasphemy laws have been used to silence
members of religious minorities and dissenters within the majority
Muslim community, and frequently result in imprisonment on account
of religion or belief and/or vigilante violence.110
In the end, defending “defamation of religion” prohibitions as promoting
human rights is hypocritical. Supporting nations employ the doctrine to
“promote human rights” while they deny citizens religious liberty and freedom
of expression. It is just another example of how states use the language of human
rights to thwart human rights.
In sum, the unquestioned push of the human rights movement to expand the
number and scope of human rights—and the use of rights talk—is an act of
hubris. This expansion will not inevitably lead to greater protection for human
rights, despite our greatest hopes and intentions. States do not always engage in
human rights-related activities in good faith. Some ratify human rights
instruments with no intention of complying with their terms. Some use human
rights language and institutions in ways that infringe human rights. The
expansion of human rights and rights talk is not just fruitless, it can be
dangerous.
II. LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND LIMITATIONS ON POWER IN HUMAN
RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BODIES

The second manifestation of the human rights movement’s hubris is its
creation of enforcement bodies that lack critical checks, limitations, and
accountability. This is an odd phenomenon. Human rights advocates of all
109. USCIRF ANN. REP. 2010, supra note 108, at 11. The Commission has found that Saudi
Arabia continues to violate religious liberty in significant ways. See USCIRF ANN. REP. 2017,
supra note 98, at 76.
110. USCIRF ANN. REP. 2010, supra note 108, at 11. The Commission has found that Pakistan
continues to violate religious liberty in significant ways. See USCIRF ANN. REP. 2017, supra note
98, at 60.
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people know how crucial limitations on power and accountability are. The
importance of such limitations flows through our human rights conventions,
especially those dealing with civil and political rights. One example is Article
9 of the ICCPR:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived
of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law . . . .
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be
entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful.111
Accountability and checks on authority—issues central to the rule of law—
are among the most important topics of discussion for human rights enforcement
bodies when they address the enforcement of human rights within the individual
nations.112 Why? We know from painful experience that unaccountable rulers
and regimes hold themselves above the law and abuse others, especially the most
vulnerable among us.
When the American framers drafted and defended the United States
Constitution, they were particularly mindful of the importance of not
consolidating power in the hands of one office or official. With a realistic view
of human nature, they vigorously championed the need for checks and balances.
Consider the following language from THE FEDERALIST NO. 51:
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It
may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
necessary to controul the abuses of government. But what is
government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is
to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this:
You must first enable the government to controul the governed; and in
the next place, oblige it to controul itself.113

111. ICCPR, supra note 13, at art. 9 paras. 1, 4.
112. Id. Similarly, the Council of Europe, created to promote human rights, has as one of its
main purposes—promotion of the rule of law. THE COUNCIL OF EUR., 800 MILLION EUROPEANS
3 (2011).
113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 316 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
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It is universally accepted that the rule of law is essential to protecting human
rights.114 States can have elegant and well-tailored laws. They can ratify
comprehensive and clear human rights conventions. But absent on-the-ground
enforcement, the benefits of those laws and conventions will not be experienced
by the average citizen.
Importantly, the rule of law is just as crucial to the just operation of human
rights enforcement bodies as it is to the states they monitor. Human rights
enforcement bodies will only be effective and act with justice if they too act
through law and under the law. As Gisela Hirschmann argues: “[A]chieving
global accountability for human rights violations would mean to establish
accountability checks for global governance institutions and non-state actors as
well.”115 The human rights movement cannot just promote checks, balances,
and accountability; it must model them.
A. International Institutions Generally

Too often, the attributes of transparency, accountability, and limitations on
power are lacking in our international bodies. Speaking of the United Nations
two decades ago, one commentator declared: “The United Nations has become
a Kafkaesque bureaucracy beset by inefficiency, systematic corruption, and
misconceived programs. Numerous diplomatic efforts to encourage UN reform
have failed.”116
Why would this be? The answer returns us to human nature as discussed in
the introduction. Though we see evil that must be confronted, we have an overly
optimistic view of human nature in general—and certainly of the individuals and
institutions dedicated to promoting human rights. In our hubris, we assume that
if we create a body to enforce something as noble as human rights, that body
will act nobly to do so—without the need to impose significant checks,
limitations, and accountability. But we are wrong. Good intentions are not
enough.

114. The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights insists: “Whereas it is
essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny
and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law.” Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 7. The United Nations similarly declares: “The rule of law and human rights
are two sides of the same principle, the freedom to live in dignity. The rule of law and human rights
therefore have an indivisible and intrinsic relationship.” Rule of Law and Human Rights, U.N.,
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-human-rights/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
115. Gisela Hirschmann, Global Governance and Human Rights—A Fruitful Relationship,
GLOBAL POL’Y J., https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/projects/global-audit/global-governanceand-human-rights-%E2%80%93-fruitful-relationship (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
116. STEFAN HALPER, Systemic Corruption at the United Nations, in DELUSIONS OF
GRANDEUR: THE UNITED NATIONS AND GLOBAL INTERVENTION 127 (Ted Galen Carpenter ed.,
1997).
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Professor Jan Klabbers, Dutch Academy Professor at the University of
Helsinki reviewed the presence of checks and balances in international
organizations and concluded:
[T]here are few, if any, general rules in international institutional law
concerning checks and balances. Partly, this may be a variation
perhaps on James Madison’s “melancholy reflection” that no
government would be necessary if men were angels. International
organizations were, for a long time, supposed to do only good, be
angelic in nature, and thus checks and balances were hardly even
discussed.117
The impact of the failure to insist upon accountability is significant. Our
enforcement bodies are too often embroiled in scandal and corruption, and the
rights of the vulnerable are at times trampled upon.118 Frequently, these bodies
shelter wrongdoers rather than calling them out. 119
The U.N. is obviously central to the promotion of human rights. It has
generated some of the most important human rights documents, including the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and important treaties such as the
ICCPR and the ICESCR. It manages some of the most significant human rights
enforcement bodies in the world such as the Human Rights Council and the
Human Rights Committee, which is the body tasked with enforcing the
ICCPR.120 Additionally, the U.N. regularly affirms the rule of law and the
values of transparency and accountability. For example, in 2015, in its
concluding observations regarding Venezuela’s compliance with the ICCPR, the
Human Rights Committee urged Venezuela to:
(b) Ensure that all human rights violations, including those that may
have been committed by private individuals with the acquiescence of
State officials, are investigated promptly, thoroughly, independently
and impartially and that the perpetrators are brought to justice and, if
found guilty, are punished in accordance with the gravity of their acts;
...

117. Jan Klabbers, Checks and Balances in the Law of International Organizations, in 1 IUS
GENTIUM: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON L. & JUSTICE 161–62 (Mortimer Sellers ed., 2008),
https://law.ubalt.edu/centers/cicl/publications/docs/Ius_Gentium_Autonomy.pdf.
118. See generally Symposium Report, Harvard Kennedy Sch. Carr Ctr. for Human Rights
Policy, Corruption and Human Rights: The Linkages, the Challenges, and Paths for Progress (Apr.
25, 2018), https://carrcenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/cchr/files/corruption_symposium_report.pdf
(discussing the connection between corruption and human rights violations).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 28 (“There shall be established a Human Rights
Committee.”).
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(d) Ensure that no one is detained arbitrarily and that all persons who
are charged with an offence have access to a fair and impartial trial. 121
Despite its public support for the values of transparency and accountability,
the United Nations has also demonstrated considerable failures to achieve these
values. One of the most egregious has come to the fore in the last two years
regarding the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers around the world. The United
Nations has engaged in more than seventy peacekeeping operations since its
inception, deploying hundreds of thousands of soldiers and tens of thousands of
civilians and law enforcement officials from more than 120 participating
countries.122
In April 2017, the Associated Press revealed the results of a comprehensive
investigation of U.N. peacekeeping efforts in twenty-three nations over twelve
years between 2004 and 2016.123 It found widespread evidence that
peacekeepers frequently acted as predators of the populations they were sent to
protect.124 It found over 2,000 allegations of sexual abuse by peacekeepers; 300
of those involved children.125
Similarly, Human Rights Watch in 2016 reported that U.N. peacekeepers in
the Central African Republic had “killed more than a dozen people, including
women and children . . . [between] December 2013 [and] June 2015.”126
Furthermore, peacekeepers were accused of “rampant sexual abuse, including
against more than 100 girls in a single prefecture in the Central African
Republic.”127
How could such abuses be perpetrated by the very people who were sent to
protect the poor, vulnerable, and oppressed? The U.N. is largely left to selfpolice its activities and personnel. Miranda Brown, who monitored peacekeeper
abuses while working at the U.N.’s Office for the High Commissioner for
121. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Periodic Report of the
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, at 4–5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/VEN/CO/R.4 (Aug. 14, 2015). See
also Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations on the Initial Report of Indonesia, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/IDN/CO/1 (Aug. 21, 2013); Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted
by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CAF/CO/2 (July 27, 2006).
122. Our History, U.N. PEACEKEEPING, http://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history (last visited
Jan. 8, 2019).
123. Paisley Dodds, AP Exclusive: U.N. Child Sex Ring Left Victims but no Arrests,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 12, 2017), https://apnews.com/e6ebc331460345c5abd4f57d77f535c1.
124. Id.
125. Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, U.N. Peacekeepers Ran a Child Sex Ring in Haiti, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Apr. 14, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/04/14/un-peacekeepers-ran-a-child-sexring-in-haiti/.
126. Dionne Searcey, U.N. to Investigate Peacekeepers Suspected of Killing Women and
Children
in
Africa,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
7,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/world/africa/central-african-republic-united-nations.html.
127. Id.
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Human Rights, declares: “The real problem is that the UN’s leadership are only
accountable to themselves.”128
Brett Schaefer, the Jay Kingham Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs
for the Heritage Foundation, insists that the U.N. fails in this effort at selfpolicing: “The United Nations and its employees enjoy broad immunities that
insulate them from external accountability. This places a heavy responsibility
on the U.N. to self-police and self-correct. Unfortunately, it has instead earned
a reputation for opacity and retaliating against those who report misdeeds by
U.N. officials and peacekeepers.”129
The U.N. has been notoriously slow in responding to allegations of
misconduct. After a review of leaked internal U.N. documents, Bloomberg
reported that “damaging accounts keep surfacing, not only of abuse but of failure
to investigate and act.”130 Peter Anthony Gallo worked from 2011 to 2015 with
the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), the office tasked with
investigating allegations of U.N. “mismanagement, misconduct, waste of
resources and abuses of authority.” 131 Gallo worked eighteen years as an
investigator in the private sector before coming to the United Nations.132 He
testified to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: “The UN has an incentive
to misrepresent the number of misconduct cases—particularly Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse cases that are reported. To do otherwise would be to
discredit their own peacekeeping activities and to admit to the ineffectiveness of
their own prevention activities.”133 Gallo likewise reported: “There is also a
willingness to close cases—including sexual exploitation and abuse cases rather than investigate them fully.” 134
While the OIOS exists to hold U.N. officials accountable and ensure that
investigations are done, Gallo insists it does not work that way:
Beholden to senior management for political patronage and other
favours, OIOS management has been able to select which reports
128. Kambiz Foroohar, Rape Scandal of U.N. Peacekeepers Festers as Reports of Abuse Grow,
BLOOMBERG
(June
16,
2016,
7:00
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/20160616/rape-scandal-of-un-peacekeepers-festers-asreports-of-abuse-grow.
129. Brett D. Schaefer, To Clean Up the U.N., We Need to Put Muscle Behind Whistleblower
Support,
HERITAGE
FOUND.
(Apr.
18,
2017),
http://www.heritage.org/globalpolitics/commentary/clean-the-un-we-need-put-muscle-behind-whistleblower-support.
130. Foroohar, supra note 128.
131. Hearing on U.N. Peacekeepers: Abuse and Accountability Before the H. Comm. on
Foreign Affairs Subcomm. on Afr., Glob. Health, Glob. Human Rights, & Int’l Orgs., 114th Cong.
1 (2016) (statement of Peter Anthony Gallo, Office of Internal Oversight Services),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA16/20160413/104766/HHRG-114-FA16-Wstate-GalloP20160413.pdf.
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id. at 5.
134. Id.
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should be investigated and which should be referred to another
department (and conveniently lost or buried).
Potentially
embarrassing cases have been closed in the face of evidence of fraud,
sexual abuse or other misconduct. There is a toxic working
environment; some investigators have been harassed, experienced
retaliation and encouraged to resign while serious misconduct
complaints against some others have been ignored.135
At times it appears that the U.N. is more concerned with protecting its
reputation than actually addressing criminal acts by peacekeepers. In 2015,
frustrated with a lack of action by the Office of High Commissioner in response
to allegations of peacekeeper abuse, Anders Kompass, field operations director
at the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, leaked a report
about alleged sexual abuse by peacekeepers in the Central African Republic,
some of whom were French diplomats in Geneva.136 The U.N.’s response was
to suspend Kompass.137 In 2016, Kompass resigned. He expressed dismay at
“the complete impunity for those who have been found to have in various
degrees abused their authority . . . This makes it impossible for me to continue
working there.”138
The scope of and outcry over the peacekeeper scandal has naturally caused
U.N. leadership to call for reform.139 But we have been here before. Over a
decade ago the world was stunned by similar allegations of sexual abuse by
peacekeepers.140 In 2005, responding to both allegations of abuse by
peacekeepers and mismanagement of the Iraq Oil for Food program, 141 Deputy
Secretary General of the United Nations Louise Fréchette declared:
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 9.
Foroohar, supra note 128.
Id.
Id.
See Alexandra Olson, Pence Applauds U.N. Resolution on Peacekeeping Reform, ARMY
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.armytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2017/09/20/penceapplauds-un-resolution-on-peacekeeping-reform/.
140. Louise Fréchette, The United Nations: Adapting to the Twenty-First Century, in
IRRELEVANT OR INDISPENSABLE? THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 14
(Paul Heinbecker & Patricia Goff eds., 2005).
141. The program was designed in 1996 to support the Iraqi people and protect them from a
humanitarian disaster after international sanctions were imposed in 1990. It permitted the Iraqi
government to engage in some oil sales so long as the proceeds were used for food, medicine and
infrastructure. However, Saddam Hussein manipulated the program to receive billions of dollars
in kickbacks and illegal surcharges from oil sales. See Sharon Otterman, Iraq: Oil Food Scandal,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 28, 2005), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/iraq-oil-foodscandal (“Wide-scale mismanagement and unethical conduct on the part of some UN employees
also plagued the program, according to the UN Independent Inquiry Committee.”). The Office of
Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) was designed to prevent such corruption,. The OIOS was
created in 1994 after the United States withheld its contribution to support the U.N.’s work until
the U.N. established an Inspector General to monitor and audit U.N. operations. Unfortunately, the
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We are gravely concerned at the failures brought to light in the Oilfor-Food Program, and appalled at the allegations of sexual abuse by
UN staff and peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and elsewhere. When problems come to light, you must act
aggressively to fix them—and that’s what we’re doing. The Secretary
General is moving swiftly on issues within his own purview—for
instance, new protections for whistleblowers, wider access to
information, higher standards to avoid conflicts of interest or
corruption by senior officials, and action to hold managers to
account.142
Without fundamental changes between 2005 and now, it is tempting to
consider current U.N. assurances that reform is forthcoming with skepticism.
However, the broader U.N. is not alone in a display of a lack of checks,
transparency, and accountability. Some of the most important human rights
enforcement organizations suffer these same deficiencies. We will look at two
of these organizations.
B. United Nations Human Rights Council

The Human Rights Council has been described as the U.N.’s principal body
dedicated to the protection of human rights.143 Yet it is a prime example of an
organization that lacks basic checks and limitations. The Human Rights Council
was created in 2006 to replace a predecessor organization, the Human Rights
Commission.144 The Commission played a crucial role in the promotion of
human rights in the years following World War II. 145 It was the drafter of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and important conventions, such as the
ICCPR and the ICESCR. It also played a role in investigating allegations of
human rights violations.146
OIOS lacked true independence and adequate staffing. Brett D. Schaefer, The Demise of the U.N.
Procurement Task Force Threatens Oversight at the U.N., HERITAGE FOUND. (Feb. 5, 2009),
https://www.heritage.org/report/the-demise-the-un-procurement-task-force-threatens-oversightthe-un. In the end it did nothing to discover or prevent this corruption. In the wake of the scandal,
the United States convinced the U.N. to create a separate Procurement Task Force (PTF) to
investigate allegations of mismanagement and fraud. The body existed successfully for two years,
uncovering fraud and waste of more than $630 million. Id. “The evidence unearthed by the [PTF]
led to misconduct findings against 17 U.N. officials and the conviction of a senior U.N.
procurement official.” Id. Regrettably, the PTF did its job too well. As punishment for pursuing
cases against Singaporean and Russian nationals, those countries led a successful effort to eliminate
the PTF in December 2008. Id.
142. Fréchette, supra note 140, at 14–15.
143. Freedman, supra note 91, at 50.
144. HURST HANNUM, DINAH L. SHELTON, S. JAMES ANAYA, & ROSA CELORIO,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 47 (6th ed. 2018).
145. Id. at 46–47.
146. Id. at 46–48, 718–19.
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In the early 2000’s, however, the Commission became the subject of much
scrutiny and criticism because of how politicized it had become. The
politicization showed itself both in its membership and activities. The
organization consisted of 53 member states “elected by the Economic and Social
Council.”147 In 2001, the General Assembly voted the United States off the
Commission while electing as members Cuba, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe — countries described by some as “a rogues’ gallery of human rights
abusers.”148 Two years later in a secret ballot election, the Commission named
Libya, a persistent human rights abuser, to be the Commission’s chair.149 By
2005, Freedom House named six of the fifty-three member nations – China,
Cuba, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe – among the world’s “worst
of the worst” abusers of human rights.150
The Commission, as constituted, proceeded to largely ignore major human
rights violations in Myanmar and North Korea and even genocide in Sudan.151
It chose not to look into the suppression of women’s rights in Saudi Arabia or
journalists in Iran; it decided not to examine the intense political repression in
Zimbabwe.152 One nation, however, was unprotected from criticism and
censure: Israel. There were as many country-specific resolutions against Israel
as there were against all other nations combined, and the Commission held
regular and special emergency sessions devoted to Israel.153
Eventually, even U.N. leaders called for the Commission’s end. U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan acknowledged: “[T]he Commission’s capacity to
perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility
and professionalism. In particular, States have sought membership of the
Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against

147. LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 419 (Foundation Press 2d ed. 2009).
148. Thalif Deen, Politics: U.S. Ouster from Rights Body Reflects Third World Anger, INTER
PRESS SERV. (May 4, 2001), http://www.ipsnews.net/2001/05/politics-us-ouster-from-rights-bodyreflects-third-world-anger/.
149. Libya Takes Human Rights Role, BBC NEWS (Jan. 20, 2003, 2:26 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2672029.stm.
150. Worst of the Worst 2005: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, FREEDOM HOUSE
(2005),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/inline_images/Intro%20%20WOW%202005.pdf.
151. Joseph Locante & Nile Gardiner, Another Charade at the United Nations, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 22, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/22/opinion/another-charade-at-the-unitednations.html.
152. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 147, at 435.
153. Brett D. Schaefer, The United Nations Human Rights Council: Repeating Past Mistakes,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 19, 2006), https://www.heritage.org/report/the-united-nations-humanrights-council-repeating-past-mistakes.
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criticism or to criticize others.”154 The General Assembly disbanded the
Commission and created the Human Rights Council to take its place.155
Given the Commission’s failures, there was much discussion of changes that
should be put in place for the newly created Human Rights Council. Many
argued that the new body should be smaller and hopefully less unwieldy. Sec.
Gen. Kofi Annan proposed that elections for member nations should be done by
a two-thirds vote, rather than a simple majority. 156 The United States, a strong
critic of the politicized Commission, called for the implementation of
membership criteria.157 It argued that only nations with a track record of
protecting human rights—and certainly not those subject to current United
Nations sanctions—should be eligible for membership.158
In the end, the General Assembly rebuffed most of these efforts. It reduced
the number of member states to forty-seven.159 But membership selection
continues to be made by a majority vote and any nation, primarily based on
equitable geographic distribution rather than on its human rights record, may be
elected.160 Member states are simply told that they “shall uphold the highest
standards in the promotion and protection of human rights.” 161
Why is membership open to human rights abusing nations? Under-Secretary
General Shashi Tharoor explained: “You don’t advance human rights by
preaching only to the converted.”162 Professor Joseph Loconte, responding to
Tharoor’s comment, notes the utopian impulse behind such a view: “Here on
display is the flawed idealism of the UN’s human-rights agenda, as if having
human-rights abusers judging human-rights cases is the way to convert them.” 163
So how should we assess the Human Rights Council after its first decade of
existence? Membership, a critical issue that plagued the predecessor Human
Rights Commission, continues to be a problem. Only twice has the majority of
member nations been “free,” as evaluated by Freedom House.164 Blatant human
154. Id.
155. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 147, at 434–36; G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 15.
156. Kenneth Roth, The U.N. Reform Agenda and Human Rights, in IRRELEVANT OR
INDISPENSABLE? THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 138 (Paul Heinbecker
& Patricia Goff eds., 2005).
157. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 147, at 435–36.
158. Id. at 436.
159. G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 15, at 3.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Joseph Loconte, The United Nations’ Disarray, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Feb. 1, 2007),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2007/february/27.40.html.
163. Id.
164. Brett D. Schaefer, U.N. Human Rights Council: A Flawed Body that Should be Replaced,
HERITAGE FOUND. (Nov. 19, 2013), https://www.heritage.org/report/un-human-rights-councilflawed-body-should-be-replaced.
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rights violators such as Cuba, China, and Saudi Arabia continue to judge their
own human rights records and those of their friends and allies. 165
How does this happen? Frequently states allied by a common interest or
regional ties will vote in blocs. One of the ways they accomplish this is to have
regions submit slates for approval that have only as many candidates as open
seats, a practice known as offering a “clean slate.”166 Ted Piccone, a senior
fellow in the Project on International Order and Strategy and Latin America
Initiative in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, supports
the Council and the United States’ participation in it. But he objects to noncompetitive slates, concluding: “In particular, the continued election of states
like China, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela, in addition to newer members like
Burundi and Ethiopia, is a sad testament to the General Assembly’s willingness
to prioritize politics over principles.”167
The Council, like the Commission before it, continues to be a highly
politicized body. In the first two years, some countries—such as Algeria, Cuba,
and China—pushed to end review and scrutiny of the records of individual
nations, “except in the case of Israel, which remained the subject of several
annually adopted resolutions and mechanisms, and is the subject of the Council’s
only country-specific agenda item.” 168
During the Bush administration, the United States chose not to seek
membership in the Human Rights Council or to participate in its activities. 169
The United States changed course during the Obama administration and was
voted to membership in 2009.170 Some feel that this improved the functioning
of the organization; there are more country-specific resolutions now and a
smaller percentage of those that condemn Israel. 171
Today, however, Israel continues to be the only nation singled out for scrutiny.
It is the sole country with a standing agenda item dedicated to it: “Human rights
165. Id.
166. Brett Schaefer, A U.N. Human Rights Council Reform Agenda for the Trump
Administration, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/globalpolitics/report/un-human-rights-council-reform-agenda-the-trump-administration.
167. Ted Piccone, Ten Years Later: The Status of the U.N. Human Rights Council, BROOKINGS
INST. 2 (May 17, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/ten-years-later-the-status-of-theu-n-human-rights-council/.
168. Country-Specific Scrutiny by the U.N. Human Rights Council: Changes Documented
During U.S. Membership, 2009–2015, JACOB BLAUSTEIN INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF HUM.
RTS (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.jbi-humanrights.org/jacob-blaustein-institute/2016/02/countryspecific-scrutiny-by-the-un-human-rights-council-changes-documented-during-us-membership200.html.
169. Neil MacFarquhar, U.S. Joins Rights Panel After Vote at the U.N., N.Y. TIMES (May 12,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/13/world/13nations.html.
170. Id.
171. Piccone, supra note 167, at 3.
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situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories.”172 There have been
more resolutions against Israel than all other nations combined.173 This is
remarkable given some of the horrific human rights violations that have occurred
during the Council’s first decade, including genocide in Sudan and the military
attacks against civilians (including the use of chemical weapons) launched by
the Syrian government of Bashar al Assad.174 Indeed, while Israel has been the
subject of seventy-eight resolutions, Sudan and Syria have been the subject of
three and nine respectively.175
While member states continue to target Israel, they also continue to use the
system to protect themselves and their allies from censure. In her book, Failing
to Protect, Professor Rosa Freedman describes how a nation like Saudi Arabia,
despite ratifying many human rights treaties, continues to deny religious liberty
and engage in discrimination, torture, and summary executions:
The country is protected by its Gulf neighbours, and by its political
allies within the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The country’s
oil and wealth, its ties with the US, and its position amongst Muslim
states means that other countries pay scant attention to its abuses and
172. Israel, the Palestinians, and the United Nations: Challenges for the New Administration,
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Middle East & N. Afr. & the Subcomm. on Afr., Glob.
Health, Glob. Human Rights, & Int’l Orgs. of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs H.R., 115th Cong. 8
(2017) (testimony of Hillel C. Neuer, Exec. Dir. United Nations Watch).
173. Schaefer, supra note 153. See Rep. of the Human Rights Council, at 8–10, U.N. Doc
A/73/53 (2018), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/Documents.aspx.
174. See ‘Clear and Convincing’ Evidence of Chemical Weapon Use in Syria, U.N. Team
Reports, U.N. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013), https://news.un.org/en/story/2013/09/449052-clear-andconvincing-evidence-chemical-weapons-use-syria-un-team-reports; See also Darfur Genocide,
JEWISH WORLD WATCH, https://www.jww.org/conflict-areas/sudan/darfur/ (last visited Aug. 25,
2019).
175. See Rep. of the Human Rights Council, supra note 173. On March 20, 2017, United States
U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley criticized the Council for its long-standing “anti-Israel bias.” Tracy
Wilkinson, Haley Accuses U.N. of ‘Anti-Israel Bias’ and Tensions Rise over Proposed U.S. Budget
Cuts, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/washington/la-na-essentialwashington-updates-u-s-spars-with-u-n-over-israel-amid-1490022960-htmlstory.html
(saying
“[t]he United States will not participate’ in discussions on the Israel-specific agenda item
‘other than to vote against the outrageous, one-sided, anti-Israel resolutions that so diminish what
the Human Rights Council should be.”). On March 20, 2017, the State Department issued the
following statement regarding how the United States intended to approach the Council and this
agenda item:
As an expression of our deeply-held conviction that this bias must be addressed in order
for the Council to realize its legitimate purpose, the United States decided not to attend
the Council’s Item Seven General Debate session. It does not serve the interests of the
Council to single out one country in an unbalanced matter. Later this week, the United
States will vote against every resolution put forth under this agenda item and is
encouraging other countries to do the same.
Press Statement, U.S. Dep’t of State, Opposition to U.N. Human Rights Council Agenda Item
Seven (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/03/268525.htm.
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care even less about holding the Saudi regime to account for its
violations against its own citizens.176
Finally, it is important in this context to recall that it is the Human Rights
Council that has passed two resolutions on “Defamation of Religion.”177 By
calling for restraints on speech in the name of human rights, the Council is
undermining freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and human rights in
general.
In sum, the Human Rights Council continues to suffer from a lack of clear
checks, balances, and accountability. Without meaningful membership criteria
and critical changes in the way member states are elected, we will continue to
have politicization and debasement of the Council’s rights enforcement work.
C. European Court of Human Rights

Lack of institutional checks and accountability are not just a U.N. problem.
They also infect the work of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
They do so, however, in a manner that is different from the Human Rights
Council. The ECtHR follows clear and detailed procedures. The problem is not
a lack of accountability in court structures, it is that the ECtHR’s approach to
interpreting the European Convention of Human Rights lacks predictability,
certainty, and accountability to the Convention’s text.
The ECtHR is the primary enforcement body of the European regional system
of human rights protection, formed under the auspices of Council of Europe.178
The Council of Europe, like the U.N., was formed shortly after World War II to
promote human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. 179 The nations of Europe
very quickly (by 1953) had not only created the Council of Europe, but they put
into force a binding human rights treaty, the European Convention on Human
Rights.180 Today, the ECtHR interprets and enforces that treaty. It stands ready
to hear petitions from any individual or group suffering a denial of human rights
within Europe.181
The ECtHR has had many successes. It has protected religious liberty,
including the right to evangelize.182 It has developed a strong jurisprudence

176. FREEDMAN, supra note 91, at 114.
177. See H.R.C. Res. 13/16, supra note 104. See also H.R.C. Res. 7/19, supra note 99.
178. DOUGLAS LEE DONOHO, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 334–38 (2017).
179. See THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 112, at 3; A Peaceful Europe-the Beginnings
of Cooperation, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/1945-1959_en
(last visited Aug. 28, 2019).
180. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention].
181. Id. at art. 34.
182. Id. at art. 9.
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dealing with forced disappearances and protections for the lives of civilians
during military operations, such as Russia’s intervention in Chechnya. 183
Unfortunately, the ECtHR uses a doctrine to interpret the European
Convention that ultimately threatens the court’s credibility and ability to protect
human rights: an evolutive interpretation of rights that is rooted in ascertaining
the consensus of member states regarding the scope and application of particular
rights.184 The ECtHR describes its approach this way:
[S]ince the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection
of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing
conditions within the respondent State and within Contracting States
generally and respond, for example, to any evolving convergence as
to the standards to be achieved . . . . It is of crucial importance that
the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders
its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. A failure
by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would
indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement. 185
Very consciously then, the ECtHR has embraced a role not only of
Convention interpretation, but also human rights reform and development. And
central to this approach is monitoring legal and social developments within
Europe relevant to the particular issue before the court.
The ECtHR first used this evolutive approach in Tyrer v. United Kingdom in
1978 when it held judicially imposing three strokes with a birch rod as
punishment for assault constituted degrading treatment under Convention
Article 3.186 The ECtHR continues to invoke the approach as an important part
of its jurisprudence.187 It does so for a noble purpose: it wants the system of
human rights protections in Europe to be relevant over time as technologies and
societies change. Unfortunately, the ECtHR uses this doctrine as a means of
enforcing its own perspective—or its perception of current European thinking—
on good public policy, with at times little regard for the text of the convention
that governs its existence and function. The ECtHR is another example of a
body that is well intentioned, but that demonstrates hubris as it determines social
policy with little accountability.
The ECtHR has used its evolutive approach especially in cases involving
sexual rights and identity. A good example is seen in a series of cases decided
between 1986 and 2002 involving the United Kingdom and transgendered
183. HENKIN ET AL., supra note 147, at 655.
184. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Dangerous Search for an Elusive Consensus: What the
Supreme Court Should Learn from the European Court of Human Rights, 52 HOW. L. REV. 277,
287, 289 (2009).
185. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
186. 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3, 14, paras. 9, 35 (1978).
187. See e.g., Pichkur v. Ukraine, 2013-V Eur. Ct. H.R.; Goodwin, VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
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individuals challenging the United Kingdom’s birth certificate record system.
The transgendered individuals in each case insisted that the United Kingdom
violated their right to “respect” for their “private and family life” under Article
8 of the European Convention by refusing to allow them to change their birth
certificates to reflect their new sexual identity.188 Consistently from 1986 to
1998—in three separate cases—the ECtHR rejected the applicants’ claims and
ruled in favor of the United Kingdom, finding that the United Kingdom had a
“wide margin of appreciation” in establishing and maintaining its birth record
system.189
The ECtHR changed course in 2002. That year, in Goodwin v. United
Kingdom, the ECtHR for the first time ruled for an applicant wishing to change
her birth certificate.190 It found that the United Kingdom had failed to respect
the applicant’s private and family life under article 8 by not allowing her to do
so.191 The European Convention’s text had not changed between 1998 and 2002.
The difference was that the ECtHR saw a change in society. Europe and the rest
of the world were taking steps toward greater acceptance of transsexuals,
including greater legal protection.
Throughout the period in which it decided this series of cases, the ECtHR
consistently asked whether there was a “European consensus” on whether
transgendered individuals should be permitted to change their birth
certificates.192 Interestingly, in 2002 the ECtHR reached the same conclusion in
Goodwin that it had before: such a consensus did not exist.193 How then did it
reach the conclusion that the United Kingdom had violated article 8 of the
convention? The court explained that
[w]hile this [lack of a European consensus] would appear to remain
the case, the lack of such a common approach among forty-three
Contracting States with widely diverse legal systems and traditions is
hardly surprising.… The Court accordingly attaches less importance
to the lack of evidence of a common European approach to the
resolution of the legal and practical problems posed, than to the clear
and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour
not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal

188. See Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986); see also Sheffield &
Horsham v. United Kingdom, 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R.; Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1990).
189. See Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13, para. 44; see also Sheffield & Horsham, 1998-V Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 16, paras. 57–58; Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12–13, para. 40.
190. Goodwin, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 27, para. 93.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 24–25, para. 85.
193. Id.
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recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative
transsexuals.194
Influential to the outcome was evidence of a “continuing international trend”
found not within Europe, but primarily in New Zealand and Australia. 195
As curious as it is that the ECtHR employed an international trend to overturn
its longstanding interpretation of Article 8, more troubling is how little the
ECtHR looked to the language of the European convention.196 Indeed, in
important respects the Goodwin opinion reads more like the report of a body of
sociologists analyzing social developments in nations across the world than a
judicial decision.
The ECtHR used the same approach in the 2009 case of Vallianatos v.
Greece.197 There applicant claimed that Greece violated the nondiscrimination
principle of Article 14 of the Convention (read in conjunction with Article 8’s
protection for private and family life) by excluding same-sex couples from
application of its civil union law.198
Greece explained why it applied its civil union law to heterosexual couples
but not to same-sex couples by pointing to the law’s main purpose: the protection
of children. It argued the law would serve to protect the legal status of those
born outside of marriage and make it easier for parents to raise children even if
not married.199 It argued that, since same-sex couples could not have biological
children, they were in a different position with regard to application of the law.200
The ECtHR acknowledged that the protection of children was a legitimate
aim. However, it insisted that it was not “necessary” for Greece to exclude
same-sex couples from application of law to protect this aim; it was possible to
both protect children and extend the law’s benefit to same-sex couples. 201
The ECtHR cited both Tyrer and Goodwin in characterizing the Convention
as “a living instrument, to be interpreted in present-day conditions.”202 In
particular, it argued that Greece “must necessarily take into account
developments in society and changes in the perception of social and civil-status
issues and relationships, including the fact that there is not just one way or one
choice when it comes to leading one’s family or private life.”203

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id. at 24, para. 84.
See European Convention, supra note 180.
2013-VI Eur. Ct. H.R.
Id. at 32, para. 92.
Id. at 24, para. 67.
Id.
Id. at 31, 32, paras. 89, 92.
Id. at 29, para. 84.
Id.
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As it had done in Goodwin, the ECtHR looked to see whether there was a
consensus on how same sex couples should be treated under the law; again it did
not find it.204 Nonetheless, it found “a trend is currently emerging with regard
to the introduction of forms of legal recognition of same-sex relationships.” 205
It highlighted the number of states that permitted same-sex marriage as well as
those that permitted civil partnerships for same-sex couples. It noted that
Lithuania and Greece were the only states that did not permit civil partnerships
to apply to same-sex couples.206
The ECtHR addressed a natural concern that arises from such an analysis—
that once a consensus or trend develops, it will be impossible for one nation to
have laws that differ from the majority. It insisted that being “in an isolated
position as regards one aspect of its legislation does not necessarily imply that
that aspect conflicts with the Convention.”207 However, this concession was not
enough to help Greece. The court found that Greece failed to offer “convincing
and weighty reasons” capable of justifying its law. 208
The Villianatos reasoning is troubling. Once again, the ECtHR determined
the meaning of a convention provision based in large part on a developing social
trend. While the ECtHR briefly referenced the text, very little of its analysis was
spent on the textual analysis. The ECtHR was engaged primarily in social
analysis and prognosis.209
The parties expected this approach. The way they engaged in advocacy in the
case demonstrates that they understood that social consensus would prove key
to analysis. Indeed, the existence of a consensus and/or trend was a central
argument raised by both the applicants and the nongovernmental organizations
that participated in the case as third-party interveners. The applicants
emphasized the trend toward legal recognition of same-sex couples throughout
Europe.210 And they insisted that Greece was “clearly and radically out of step
with the norm among European countries in that regard.”211
Similarly, the interveners canvassed legal developments regarding the
treatment of same-sex couples and argued that “Greece was unique, as it was the
only European country to have introduced civil unions while excluding samesex couples from their scope of application.”212
204. Id. at 31, para. 91.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 32, para. 92.
208. Id.
209. See generally id. (reiterating the courts obligation to take into account societal changes in
its analysis).
210. Id. at 21, para. 60.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 25, para. 69.
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It is not just in matters of sexual rights or identity that the ECtHR applies this
evolutive approach based on consensus. The ECtHR similarly did so in a 2013
decision involving criminal punishment: Vinter v. United Kingdom.213 There,
the ECtHR ruled that a United Kingdom law permitting life sentences without
the prospect of release or possibility of review amounted to inhuman or
degrading treatment in violation of Convention Article 3.214
In Vinter, too, the ECtHR based its decision much more on its interpretation
of current trends in European social policy than on an interpretation of the
Convention’s language. It found particularly significant that rehabilitation is
“now” the main “emphasis” of European penal policy: “[t]he Court has already
had occasion to note that, while punishment remains one of the aims of
imprisonment, the emphasis in European penal policy is now on the
rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, particularly towards the end of a long prison
sentence.”215 Similarly, “there is also now clear support in European and
international law for the principle that all prisoners, including those serving life
sentences, be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of release
if that rehabilitation is achieved.”216 To bolster its conclusion on this front the
ECtHR canvassed not only European penal law, but also penal trends around the
world.217
Having found that penal law had moved in the direction of rehabilitation, the
ECtHR ruled that Article 3 now requires that every punishment must provide for
the possibility of rehabilitation.218 This includes life sentences: “[T]he Court
considers that, in the context of a life sentence, Article 3 must be interpreted as
requiring reducibility of the sentence . . . .”219 Thus, though Article 3 says
nothing about rehabilitation—or any theory of punishment at all—the ECtHR
determined that life sentences without the possibility of release or review are
inhuman or degrading.220
In a partially dissenting opinion, Judge Villiger highlighted the decision’s lack
of rooting in the Convention’s text: “To begin with, I note that in the judgment
(for example, at §§ 121 et seq.) reference is made to the ‘standards’ and
213. App. Nos. 66069/09, 130/10 & 3896/10 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 9, 2013), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-122664. For an excellent discussion of Vinter and the dangers
of the ECtHR’s evolutive approach, see Ernie Walton, Preserving the European Convention on
Human Rights: Why the U.K.’s Threat to Leave the Convention Could Save It, 42 CAP. U. L. REV.
977, 980–83 (2014).
214. Vinter, App. Nos. 66069/09, 130/10 & 3896/10 at 44, paras. 121–22.
215. Id. at 42, para. 115.
216. Id. at 42, para. 114.
217. Id. at 19–31, § III, paras. 59–75.
218. Id. at 42, para. 114.
219. Id. at 44, para. 119.
220. Id.
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‘requirements’ of Article 3. However, nowhere in the judgment are these
standards and requirements explained, analysed and applied.”221
Why should we be concerned by the ECtHR’s evolutive approach? First, the
approach undermines the rule of law.222 The rule of law values predictability,
certainty, and equal application of the law. The ECtHR itself insists that such
values are vital.223 But the evolutive approach undermines these very values. In
Goodwin, the United Kingdom had no way to know that the emergence of a
trend outside of Europe would prompt the ECtHR to rule differently than it had
in three previous cases over a 16-year period. Critically, the ECtHR does not
tell us how one knows if a consensus or trend has been achieved or even what a
trend is. There is no legal standard to be applied.224
The ECtHR has created uncertainty regarding other important human rights
questions in Europe as states wait to see if or when the ECtHR will declare that
a consensus exists. In Lambert v. France, for example, the ECtHR refused to
determine that removal of artificial hydration and nutrition would violate Article
2’s right to life, concluding that there is no consensus among member states
regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.225 Similarly, in
Hämäläinen v. Finland, the ECtHR found that there is no consensus on whether
recognition of same sex marriage is required by Article 8’s requirement that
states respect private and family life.226 Rather than providing clarity and
certainty on these important issues, the ECtHR approach instead creates
uncertainty for states and individuals about how these issues will be resolved in
the years to come. Euthanasia and same-sex marriage are hotly debated topics
worldwide, and laws regarding them are changing. At what point will those
changes amount to a consensus or trend sufficient for the ECtHR to reinterpret
the convention’s requirements? No one knows. In fact, no one knows exactly
what evidence will be sufficient to show that the consensus threshold has been
reached.
It is inherently problematic basing decisions about fundamental human rights
on the shifting sands of contemporary social policy. European penal policy may
221. Id. at 62 (Villiger, J., partly dissenting).
222. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Margin of Appreciation and the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights: Threat to the Rule of Law, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 113,
147–50 (2004). See also Walton, supra note 213, at 989–97 (discussing the threat European
Consensus has on the rule of law).
223. Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 21, para. 74 (“[I]t is in the interests
of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good
reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases.”).
224. See generally id. at paras. 74–75 (discussing how the court does not have to follow
precedent but apply standards based on present conditions).
225. App. No. 46043/14 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 6, 2015), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-155352.
226. App. No. 37359/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 16, 2014), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-145768.
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“now” be rooted in rehabilitation, but that may well change. In the United States,
rehabilitation was the dominant philosophy in early part of 20th century, but then
fell out of favor as many of rehabilitation’s weaknesses became apparent as
crime rates rose in the second half of the century. 227 Eugenics and compulsory
sterilization, too, once comported with current trends and accepted notions of
the best social policy both in Europe and the United States.228 Something as
important as human rights should not depend on the current state of social trends.
The ECtHR is not only crafting European social policy, it is doing so with few
checks, balances, or accountability. There is no appellate court with jurisdiction
to review ECtHR decisions.229 There is only the possibility of a case being
reviewed by a grand chamber (17 judges) of the same court or some political
intervention by the Committee of Ministers.230 And especially troubling, the
doctrine means that the ECtHR is not truly accountable to the text of the
Convention. In cases like Vinter and Goodwin, the text played a very small role
in the cases’ outcomes.
The second problem with this evolutive approach is that it undermines the
ECtHR’s very purpose—the protection of human rights. A consensus is a
strongly majoritarian concept. But by their nature, human rights are countermajoritarian. Individuals have rights that must be protected even if those in
power or if the majority in a nation choose not to recognize those rights. So, it
is inherently problematic to base the determination of the nature and scope of
human rights on the consensus of nations.
The response of ECtHR’s defenders is that the ECtHR only uses its evolutive
approach to expand, rather than contract, the protection of rights. But there is
no reason to believe that this will always be the case. In fact, it is not the case
now. Consider the 2010 judgment in Mangouras v. Spain.231 In Mangouras,
the ECtHR relied on trends in the way environmental crimes are viewed within
Europe to restrict the right to bail for a criminal defendant in an oil leak case.232
Apostolos Ioannis Mangouras was the ship’s master on the Prestige, which
leaked 70,000 tons of fuel oil into the Atlantic Ocean of the coast of Spain in
227. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective
on the Past Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (2003).
228. See BRAUCH, supra note 19, at 83–85 (describing how the U.N. General Assembly
approved the Universal Declaration of Human Rights after WWII in order to protect the rights of
all humans against the evil that had occurred during the war).
229. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 1, 10 (2014),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf.
230. Id. at 4, para. 9.
231. App. No. 12050/04 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Sept. 28, 2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-100686.
232. See generally id. at 8–19, § II, paras. 28–55 (discussing the relevant domestic and
international law and practice, including the use of criminal law as a means of enforcing the
environmental obligations imposed by the E.U.).
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2002.233 The leak had a devastating effect on marine life, the fishing industry,
and tourism.234
Once Mangouras was arrested, the judge set bail at 3 million euros, a figure
Mangouras was unable to pay and which resulted in him spending much pretrial time in jail.235 He alleged that this bail violated Article 5(3) of the
Convention, which provides: “Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with
the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article … shall be entitled to trial within
a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by
guarantees to appear for trial.”236
The ECtHR acknowledged that the purpose of bail under the Convention is
“to ensure not the reparation of loss but, in particular, the appearance of the
accused at the hearing.”237 Thus bail should take into account the means of the
accused as well as the risk that he or she will abscond before trial. 238 How then
did the ECtHR uphold a bail amount that was so high and well beyond the
accused means to pay? The ECtHR conceded that it could not ignore the
“growing and legitimate concern both in Europe and internationally in relation
to environmental offences.”239 The court acknowledged “that these new realities
have to be taken into account in interpreting the requirements of Article 5 § 3 in
this regard.”240
The “new realities” referenced by the ECtHR are social trends that have taken
place regarding oil spills and our response to them, and the ECtHR relied on
these “new realities” to change its interpretation of Article 5. It allowed Spain
to set bail, not primarily based on ensuring Mangouras’ appearance at trial, but
instead based on the seriousness of the offences in question and the extent of
damage caused.241
The seven dissenting judges (the outcome was by a 10–7 decision) insisted
strongly that the ECtHR was reinterpreting Article 5 just for cases like this. 242
Had this been an ordinary case—and not one involving a high-profile
environmental disaster—the ECtHR would likely have ruled the other way. To
the dissenters the gravity of the offense must not be the “decisive factor

233. Id. at 3, paras. 14–15.
234. Id. at 3–4, para. 16.
235. Id. at 4–5, paras. 17–18.
236. European Convention, supra note 180, at 9, art. 5, para. 3.
237. Mangouras, App. No. 12050/04, at 26, para. 78.
238. Id. at paras. 79–80.
239. Id. at 28, para. 86.
240. Id. at 28, para. 87.
241. Id. at 4–5, 29, paras. 17–18, 92.
242. See id. at 31, para. 1 (Joint dissenting opinion) (rejecting the Court’s decision of setting
the bail at three million euros in contravention of art. 5 § 3).
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justifying the size of the bail.”243 The fact that it was the decisive factor here
rendered “illusory the applicant’s ability to secure his release from custody.” 244
This is just one example of how human rights protections may contract rather
than expand through use of the evolutive approach. As incidents of global
terrorism continue to increase, we may find that a future consensus on
appropriate means to combat that terrorism may embrace stronger measures and
more infringements on freedom of expression or privacy—perhaps even
infringements that would be viewed as human rights violations today.
It is simply not the case that a consensus approach will only expand our
protection of human rights. The evolutive approach and the consensus standard
are threats to both the rule of law and the protections of human rights.
The ECtHR, for all of its successes, is another example of a human rights
enforcement entity that lacks sufficient checks, balances, and accountability.
And this lack poses a threat to the long-term protection of human rights.
III. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

How are we as human rights advocates to confront not only the evil around us
but the evil—particularly the hubris—within? There are several concrete steps
we need to take so that the human rights movement will be effective in
confronting evil and protecting the dignity of all human beings for generations
to come.
First, it is time to change the human rights movement’s aim from further
expansion of rights to enforcement of core rights to which states have already
agreed. As Professor David Smolin notes: “It is an odd feature of the human
rights movement that although it has failed to successfully implement principles
with broader acceptance, such as the bans on genocide, slavery, and torture, it
has continued to define ever more specific and controversial additional
rights.”245
We don’t need additional working groups articulating increasingly vague and
largely non-enforceable aspirations and calling them human rights. We recently
spent six years carefully crafting a right to peace.246 While world peace is a
noble aspiration, and one to which the nations of the world should work, that
declaration will do little to actually bring about peace. Such efforts only distract
us and dilute our efforts.
Worse, our expansion of the body of “rights” actually harms our ability to
enforce agreed upon rights. With over 1300 possible individual obligations (at
least for European nations) and the notion that all rights are equal, we are
243. Id. at 34, para. 8 (Joint dissenting opinion).
244. Id.
245. Smolin, supra note 48, at 1540.
246. Press Release, Spanish Soc’y for Int’l Human Rights Law, The United Nations Gen.
Assembly Approves Declaration on the Right to Peace (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.worldpsi.org/en/united-nations-general-assembly-approves-declaration-right-peace.
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unwittingly giving cover to repressive regimes to shield human rights abuses and
even use the language of rights in a disingenuous way that works to undermine
real rights enforcement.
Emilie Hafner-Burton has it right:
It probably sounds counterintuitive, but halting the production of more
such laws, bureaucracy, and treaty bodies might pave the way for
giving the international legal system more force and reach . . . . Thus,
the first way to make reforms more feasible is to stop the system’s
swell of obligations and procedures. A pause would give reforms a
better chance to work.247
Beyond just halting the growth of new human rights institutions and norms,
however, we need to turn our attention to actual enforcement. This will mean
placing our energy and focus on fewer and more core rights. We should put a
spotlight on those rights that are most foundational to human life and dignity—
and those that are crucial for functioning justice systems—and then work
diligently for their enforcement. Aspirational goals are inspiring, but
enforceability ought to be a key criterion for where we should put our efforts.
So should protecting life and ending violence. A helpful start would be to focus
on those rights declared by the Universal Declaration that are subject to actual
monitoring and enforcement. Our time and efforts should be devoted to such
fundamental rights as the right to life, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom
from arbitrary arrest, free speech and religion, etc.
We need humility. Hubris thwarts and may ultimately destroy our work. We
should instead focus on modest and achievable goals. In his book, The Last
Utopia, Samuel Moyn presents a choice that confronts the movement: embrace
either a utopian and maximalist political vision or a set of minimalist ethical
norms. While the former may be inspirational and wonderful for rhetorical
purposes, we need the latter to actually make an impact. In terms of our effort
and financing, our focus must be on the enforceable rather than the purely
aspirational.
Second, we should direct our efforts very intentionally toward enforcement of
the rule of law around the world. As described above, we do not have a problem
with too few human rights conventions with detailed norms. If anything, we
have too many.248
247. HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 65, at 130.
248. See Craig A. Stern, Human Rights or the Rule of Law—The Choice for East Africa?, 24
MICH. ST. INT’L L. REV. 45, 66 (2015):
The very commitment to securing a wide range of human rights contributes to the
difficulty of securing the rule of law. Among the rights civil governments in East Africa
pledge themselves to secure are broad positive rights, rights that oblige the governments
by law to supply such goods as health, education, employment, and housing. The
contingencies and qualifications entailed in these rights distinguish them from negative
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In the same way, many nations have strong, well-tailored laws. Take human
trafficking, for example. Five nations with large numbers of enslaved
individuals include: India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Uzbekistan.249
Each has a law forbidding purchase and sale of human beings. 250 India’s law is
excellent. Indian Penal Code (IPC) Section 370 “prohibits slavery, servitude,
and most forms of sex trafficking and prescribes penalties ranging from seven
years to life imprisonment, which are sufficiently stringent and commensurate
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape.” 251 The problem is
that too often these laws go unenforced. And without enforcement, they are
meaningless to the average citizen.
Nearly a decade ago, a United Nations report observed that “most poor people
do not live under the shelter of the law, but far from the law’s protection.” 252
While poverty levels are lower than they once were, in 2008, approximately 2.5
billion people lived on less than $2 per day. 253 And the poor are particularly
vulnerable to lawlessness. Gary Haugen and Victor Boutros, in their book, The
Locust Effect, conclude that the poor “are—by the hundreds of millions—
threatened every day with being enslaved, imprisoned, beaten, raped, and
robbed.”254
Sadly, those people live in places where there are criminal laws and where
police, prosecutors, and judges purport to enforce that law. Yet in many
communities, law enforcement fails because the rule of law is absent.
How does this occur? Too often, police are a danger rather than a protection.
In a large-scale study of poverty, the World Bank concluded: “Particularly in
urban areas, poor people perceive the police not as upholding justice, peace and
fairness, but as threats and sources of insecurity.”255 Why? In many places, a
shortage of officers and low pay induce some to act corruptly. And while most
police officers are dedicated to doing right, too many engage in extortion, sexual
assault, and abusive detention.256
Effective law enforcement can fail at the level of prosecutors and judges, too.
Sometimes the failure is simply a result of overwhelming and unmanageable
caseloads. In Uganda, children sometimes sit in remand homes for years
rights and yet, as explained above, at the same time may present a threat to negative
rights. These factors likewise present a threat to the rule of law.
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U.S. Dep’t. of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, 80, 126, 205, 311, 423 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 205.
GARY A. HAUGEN & VICTOR BOUTROS, THE LOCUST EFFECT 16 (2014).
Id. at 39.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 82–83.
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because the justice system is not equipped to process cases appropriately. 257
Children in such situations, even when guilty, can serve more time in pretrial
detention than they would have served in total after a just sentence.258 Even
worse, where judges and prosecutors are underpaid and overworked, they can
turn to extortion and other abuses of power. Haugen and Boutros note the impact
this has: “Throughout much of the developing world, the prosecution segment
of the justice pipeline has been allowed to gradually collapse into a nearly
impenetrable barrier to meaningful enforcement of the law.” 259
Where is human rights law in all of this? We can have the most compelling,
well-written declarations and conventions, but they will be meaningless without
basic law enforcement. Haugen and Boutros conclude: “There are billions for
whom the promise of the human rights revolution remains a check they cannot
cash.”260
Rather than creating more conventions, we need to focus our attention on
combating violence through real, on the ground law enforcement. Some nations
have done this with success. While it struggles with certain things, the nation of
Georgia is an example of a nation that has made real progress on law
enforcement by making the rule of law a priority. 261 Those associated with the
human rights movement must have a critical role of coming alongside nations
and supporting them in enforcing their own domestic laws.
The work needed to promote the rule of law in concrete ways in some aspects
parallels changes that have taken place in the world of development economics
over the past fifteen years. Like the movement to promote human rights, the
movement to end poverty in the developing world has long been characterized
by a strong utopian streak. In 1857, utopian socialist Robert Owen wrote:
that science which in its natural progress will ultimately develope the
means by which, with the certainty of a law of nature, the human race
shall be perpetually well born, fed, clothed, lodged, trained, educated,
employed, and recreated, locally and generally governed, and placed
to enjoy life in the most rational matter one arth, and to best fit them
for whatever change may occur after death.262
257. See generally JIM GASH, DIVINE COLLISION: AN AFRICAN BOY, AN AMERICAN LAWYER,
REMARKABLE BATTLE FOR FREEDOM (Worthy Press 2015) (detailing the procedures
of the Ugandan justice system).
258. Id.
259. HAUGEN & BOUTROS, supra note 252, at 141.
260. Id. at 167.
261. See WJP Rule of Law Index 2016, WORLD JUST. PROJECT 5 (2016),
https://www.worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016;
Georgia: Rule of Law, USAID, https://www.usaid.gov/georgia/rule-of-law (last visited Jan. 10,
2019).
262. I.A. ROBERT OWEN, A SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX TO THE FIRST VOLUME OF THE LIFE
OF ROBERT OWEN 5 (Supp. 1967).
AND THEIR
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Owen’s grand vision is not much different from the one articulated in the 2000
United Nations Millennium Goals to “eradicate extreme hunger and poverty,” 263
and to “achieve universal primary education”264 by 2015. MDG defenders such
as Professor Jeffrey Sachs argued that extreme poverty could be ended within a
short time if nations simply double their anti-poverty spending.265
In 2006, a year after Sach’s bold call to end extreme poverty, NYU professor
William Easterly released the very influential book, The White Man’s Burden:
Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little
Good.266 He argued that utopian goals, while inspiring, were actually fruitless
and even counterproductive.267 Easterly described how the developmental
economic community sought for years to reduce poverty through top-down
approaches that ignored the realities and complexities within individual settings
and nations.268 That movement, like the human rights movement, demonstrated
a hubris that championed lofty and noble aims, but frequently did not actually
achieve them.
Encouragingly, in the last decade, there has been a move toward greater use
of on-the-ground solutions empowering what Easterly describes as searchers—
people who respond to concrete needs and provide concrete solutions—rather
than planners who embrace a top-down approach. Indeed, as individuals and
nations have followed focused and modest prescription, they have seen real
successes on certain key issues. For example, Kenya saw a sharp drop in Malaria
nationwide after undertaking a mass bed net distribution in 2006 and 2007.269
The Kenyans used data from past efforts, both successes and failures, and
catered the program to the specific context of their country. 270 As another
example, starting in 2011, Nigeria spurred economic growth through a creative

263. MDG 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty and Hunger, MILLENNIUM DEV. GOALS,
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national business plan competition in which entrepreneurs were given $50,000
to start a new business or expand an existing one.271
Professor Eric Posner summarizes the significant changes that have occurred
in the development economic world this way:
Much greater attention is paid to the minutiae of social context, as it
has become clear that a vaccination programme that works well in one
location may fail in another, for reasons relating to social order that
outsiders do not understand. Expectations have been lowered; the goal
is no longer to convert poor societies into rich societies, or even to
create market institutions and eliminate corruption; it is to help a
school encourage children to read in one village, or to simplify lending
markets in another.272
In his book, The Endtimes of Human Rights, Stephen Hopgood has a similar
prescription for the human rights movement. He says that it is time to promote
“human rights” rather than “Human Rights.” By “Human Rights” he means the
top-down edifice of human rights enforcement: “a global structure of laws,
courts, norms, and organizations that raise money, write reports, run
international campaigns, open local offices, lobby governments, and claim to
speak with singular authority in the name of humanity as a whole.”273 He
captures the hubris of “Human Rights” by describing it as: “a kind of secular
monotheism with aspirations to civilize the world.”274
In contrast, by “human rights,” Hopgood means the activists on the ground
who “combat [ ] violence and privation.” They raise awareness, put pressure on
governments, and “demand their own freedom and justice in whatever language
they prefer. These ethical and political claims are rooted in our shared interest
in fair and equal treatment.”275
Human rights can be used tactically to help prevent torture,
disappearances, or extrajudicial executions or to demand economic
and social rights to food, water, and health care. It is a flexible and
negotiable language. It does not “defend human rights,” it defends the
person. It is a means, not an end in itself.276
Hopgood is exactly right that we should direct our efforts to on-the-ground
protection of individuals from violence, oppression, and slavery. In doing so,
we move from utopian dreams—and our own hubris—and put the protection of
individuals front and center.
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Of course, as we engage in the hard, on-the-ground work of promoting the
rule of law, we still need international enforcement bodies. The third and final
recommendation is that in every international organization, we must insist on
transparency and accountability, with checks and balances. The discussion
above analyzed two human rights enforcement bodies in depth, the Human
Rights Council and the ECtHR. The Human Rights Council desperately needs
meaningful membership criteria. There should be a minimal standard of human
rights compliance before a nation may stand for election. Election should be
done by a two-thirds vote and clean slates should not be permitted. The Council
rightfully should be a respected and effective instrument of human rights
enforcement. It cannot be so without fundamental changes like these. We need
to restructure the Human Rights Council before it suffers the same humiliating
end that came to the Human Rights Commission before it.
The ECtHR must embrace humility and accountability as well. The judges
must recognize that they are not the platonic guardians of European social
policy. Above all, they need to exercise the discipline of faithfully interpreting
and abiding by the Convention’s text.277 It is the text to which 47 nations have
bound themselves, not ever-changing social trends as perceived by the current
set of ECtHR judges. It is the text alone that embodies any consensus that exists.
By embracing an evolutive approach rooted in trends and consensus, the ECtHR
is undermining its credibility and the ultimate enforceability of the key rights
protected under the convention.
Some will object that such a move would prevent the Council of Europe from
responding to cultural changes and will leave human rights unprotected. But
this is not the case. European states have now ratified 16 protocols to the
European Convention on issues ranging from changing ECtHR procedures to
banning the death penalty and articulating right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose one’s residence.278 This is not a situation where an
amendment process exists in theory but is functionally unavailable. Yet despite
the receptivity of European states to new protocols, the ECtHR continues to
enforce unratified norms through judicial fiat.
Reform is needed for all international enforcement bodies, not just the two
highlighted. In any international organization, including and perhaps especially
those enforcing human rights, there must be institutional commitments to
transparency and accountability. For instance, there must be independent
oversight and, as Anthony Gallo has urged regarding the U.N. OIOS, there must
be protection for whistle blowers. Here as well, good motives are not enough.
We need to work diligently to create organizations that will fulfill the purpose
for which they were created.
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The human rights movement is fueled by noble aspirations. It has achieved
much in the confrontation of evil and the promotion of fundamental rights
around the world. But in addition to confronting the evil in the world around us,
it must also confront the evil within. In particular, it must abandon hubris and
embrace humility. That includes humility in our aspirations and humility in the
way we operate our organizations from day-to-day. It means focusing attention
on fewer and more core rights—those that are clear, enforceable, and protect
individuals from violence. It means implementing the rule of law so that the
rights we declare are enjoyed by people on the ground. And it means creating
human rights organizations with checks and balances that model transparency
and accountability. In so doing we will better achieve the goal of protecting the
rights and dignity of all humans, the purpose for which the movement began.
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